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In the early 1990’s the Society of Christian Philosophers (SCP) began a sub-
stantial endeavor to engage in dialogue with scholars in non-English lan-
guage countries on topics at the intersections of philosophy and religious
belief. The two most successful of these endeavors have focused on China
and Russia. The ongoing relationship with scholars and institutions of
higher learning in Russia began with two conferences, in 1993 and 1997,
held in St. Petersburg and organized by Dr. Melville Stewart. Each of the
two conferences included approximately sixteen presenters, with equal
representation of Anglo-American and Russia scholars. The Anglo-
American scholars were largely SCP members while Russian scholars were
selected and invited by the host institution, the Higher School of Religion
and Philosophy at St Petersburg. The first meeting of these conferences
was funded by the International Institute of Christian Studies. The second
was funded by the Baptist General Conference.
There were a substantial number of interested students and scholars
from many parts of the former Soviet Union in attendance at both confer-
ences and each resulted in significant advances in understanding between
scholars from these cultures.
As a result of these successes, the Society of Christian Philosophers
established a standing committee to continue to foster this relationship and
these significant cross cultural exchanges. This initiative led to an impor-
tant conference in 2001, on the topic of the Trinity, which was graciously
co-sponsored by the Theological Commission of the Russian Orthodox
Church. The meeting opened with a message of welcome from Patriarch
Alexii II, the head of the Church. Presiding over the conference was the
Chair of the Commission, Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk.
Through 2001, all of the SCP-Russia conferences had been held in Russia.
However, in 2003, the SCP, in conjunction with the Center for Philosophy of
Religion at the University of Notre Dame, and with the sponsorship of the
Templeton Foundation, the Societies of St. Sergius and St. Albans, and the
Paul and Dawn Sjolund Foundation was proud to host a delegation of
Russian scholars for a three day conference at the University of Notre Dame
on the topic of the intersections between theology and physical cosmology.
As in the past, the aim of the 2003 conference was to provide a forum for
cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural discussions on a topic of central impor-
tance at the intersection of philosophy and religious thought. This particu-
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Filaret of Minsk, and nine Anglo-American scholars, including theologians,
philosophers, and scientists, to discuss a variety of issues in science and reli-
gion, with a specific focus on the connections between religion and cosmol-
ogy. This volume contains the proceedings of that conference.
The Conference
The conference was held from January 31 through February 2 at McKenna
Hall on the Notre Dame campus. This gathering of scholars reaffirmed the
fact that mutual interchange between the disciplines of contemporary cos-
mology and Christian philosophy can be fruitful. The conference papers
focused on a variety of issues from the apparent fine-tuning of the universe,
to the relation of God and time, to the interpretation of Genesis and contem-
porary cosmology. On the issue of cosmic fine-tuning, it is clear that the con-
ference advanced the issue beyond what might be seen as a current impasse.
So far as using the facts of physical cosmology as a way of arguing for intelli-
gent design is concerned, both the problems that must be faced and the
prospects for success were clarified.
There were fifteen sessions in all, and attendance for them in McKenna
Hall varied between a low of some fifty and a high of one hundred thirty
(excluding participants). Several scientists from different universities were
in the audience, along with many philosophers. Indeed, twelve or thirteen
eminent American philosophers of religion were in attendance. There were
also students, both graduates and undergraduates, from Notre Dame,
Calvin College, Wheaton College, Taylor University, and other institutions.
As in past conferences, participants were heavily dependent on transla-
tors. However, translation issues intruded less than at previous SCP-Russia
conferences. This was undoubtedly due to the substantial expertise of our
translators, Yuri Balashov and Nataliya Pukha, both of whom are Russian
natives living in the United States and who have Ph.D. degrees in philoso-
phy and religious studies, respectively. (Indeed, Balashov teaches philoso-
phy at the University of Georgia).
The SCP and the members of the Russia Committee would like to
express their sincere gratitude to the sponsors of the conference: The John
Templeton Foundation, The Notre Dame Center for Philosophy of Religion,
The Society of St. Sergius and St. Albans, and the Paul and Dawn Sjolund
Foundation. In addition, thanks are due to Ashton Sperry and Samuel
Murray for assistance in the editing of the proceedings and to Ali Oduncu
for his tireless work during the conference itself. Finally, special recognition
is due to the Russia Committee of the SCP which organized the event.
Members of that Committee are Richard Swinburne, Melville Stewart,
Stephen T. Davis, andMichael Murray.1
The Present Volume
Of the fifteen papers presented at the conference, thirteen are represented
here. In addition, one set of comments offered at the conference has been
included.
As noted above, the topics of the conference papers ranged widely over
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the general issues of theology and physical cosmology. The first essay
here, “God and Physical Cosmology” by Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk,
sets out various ways in which naturalism provides a grossly incomplete
picture of the cosmos and of the place of human beings in that cosmos. At
the level of cosmology this inadequacy becomes evident since naturalism
fails to see the universe as something which is created and which results
from the free choice of the creator. But there are further issues as well,
Metropolitan Filaret argues. For example, the naturalist scientist fails to
grasp important notions such as the fact that the universe is made, in part,
for its human inhabitants, that the laws which govern the cosmos are con-
tingent on the divine will, and that decay in the universe must be under-
stood as something more than, for example, entropy.
In “Cosmology of the Cappadocian Fathers: A Contribution to Dialogue
between Science and Theology Today,” Professor Shmaliy looks at the
development of theology in the early church as it sought to construct a dis-
tinctively Christian understanding of the cosmos. The Christian concep-
tion of cosmos was in many respects radically discontiguous with extant
philosophical trends. On the Christian view, the cosmos was created ex
nihilo, by a contingent act of divine will, for the purpose of creating persons
in the divine image, in a cosmic framework that facilitated interpersonal
relations between God and creatures. Professor Shmaliy argues that this
notion of the cosmos as deeply infused with the personal grew naturally
out of the theological reflection of the Cappodocian fathers who focused
specifically on the personal nature of God and the Trinity. This conception
of the cosmos as personal developed from distinctively theological roots,
quite independently of the cosmology of the day. As a result, he argues, it
stands to provide us with a fruitful starting point for theologically sensitive
reflection on the nature of the cosmos, in stark contrast to the naturalism
which pervades contemporary cosmology.
The next three essays claim that some recent discoveries in physics and
cosmology show that the current scientific picture of the world coheres
remarkably well with the Biblical picture of cosmos. William Lane Craig
argues, in “Divine Eternity and the General Theory of Relativity,” that
despite the claimed denial of absolute simultaneity entailed by relativity,
there is room for the notion of absolute, cosmic time which represents both
real time for the universe as well as divine time. In addition, in “Physical
Cosmology in Relative Units” Professor Pervushin provides a two part argu-
ment that the evidence of contemporary cosmology is consistent with, and
even suggestive of, an account of creation akin to the one endorsed in typical
Western theism. He first begins by noting the fact that cosmologists utilize
two different measurement standards depending on which class of cosmo-
logical problems they address. One standard regards the fundamental phys-
ical metrics as absolute, the other regards them as relative. Pervushin argues
first that the relative measure should be given physical priority. He then
goes on to claim that once we adopt a description of the cosmos cast in rela-
tive physical units, the evidence for divine activity is even more powerful,
and on two fronts. First, the underlying symmetries present in the relative
or conformal cosmologies are striking in a way that seems inexplicable
absent a cosmic designer. In addition, all competing naturalist theories
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ignore the deep conceptual issues raised concerning the origin both of space-
time and the matter the universe contains. Finally, in “Cosmological
Contingency and Theistic Explanation,” Philip Quinn takes up a variety of
issues surrounding the legitimacy of questions which concern the explana-
tion both of the existence of the universe and of its nomological structure.
The essay is inspired by some work by Adolf Grünbaum in which
Grünbaum argues that questions of this sort illicitly rely on mere pseudo-
problems. Quinn argues, on the contrary, that these sorts of questions do not
differ in kind from other explanation-seeking contrastive questions we ordi-
narily encounter. To demonstrate this, Quinn commends a strategy where-
by we think of these questions in terms of questions concerning why a par-
ticular possible world is actual as opposed to some other possible world. In
this way, the similarity between cosmological contrastive questions and
ordinary ones becomes evident.
Seven of the essays treat issues centering largely on the apparent fine-
tuning of the universe. This set of seven begins with a programmatic essay
by Ernan McMullin. McMullin reviews the origins of the fine-tuning dis-
cussion dating back to the discovery of the flatness of the universe by
Collins and Hawking. Rather than arguing for one conclusion on the issue,
McMullin shows that there are four broad categories of available options.
We must conclude that the apparent fine tuning is ultimately explained
either by appeal to chance, design, the existence of many universes, or
some underlying factor which unifies the apparently disparate facts consti-
tuting the apparently fine tuned arrangement.
The next two essays are authored by American cosmologists who argue
against theism as an explanation for the cosmological data. The first essay
by Joel Primack provides a broad overview of the relationship between
religion and cosmological reflection from ancient Greece to the present.
Primack defends the common but controversial claim that since the
Enlightenment, scientific cosmological accounts gained autonomy from
religious cosmological myths. After providing a brief description of the
state of contemporary scientific cosmology, Primack explains that such
views can, like religious myths, still provide us with controlling metaphors
for thinking about human beings and their collective fate. For example, he
claims, reflection on cosmic inflation can lead human beings to consider
how our global civilization must transition from our current trajectory of
inflating consumption to a sustainable level of resource use.
Sean Carroll continues in a manner congenial to Primack’s position by
arguing that the materialist or naturalist conception of the cosmos is simpler
than the theistic picture since theism adds an additional entity, namely,
God. In light of this, he claims, only two things could lead us to favor the
more complex theistic picture. The first would be the discovery of some fea-
ture of the world which could not possibly be explained in terms of natural
facts, as emphasized in God-of-the-gap style arguments. The second would
be a discovery that the universe turns out in fact to be explained more sim-
ply by postulating the existence of God, as, for example, design arguments
have typically held. Carroll claims that, with respect to the first, we simply
do not know of any phenomenon which we can say with confidence cannot
be explained by appeal to natural facts. With respect to the second, Carroll
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considers the argument from fine tuning as an example. However, he
argues that we simply do not know enough about what the universe would
be like were the fundamental parameters to be different, nor do we know
what conditions are necessary in order for intelligent life to exist. Further,
there are facts about the universe that seem at odds with the claim that the
universe is intelligently designed, such as its utter spatial vastness.
At the conference, Peter van Inwagen provided comments on Carroll’s
paper and those comments are included here. Van Inwagen takes issues
with Carroll’s argument, claiming that even if we were to grant Carroll’s
major claims, the most we could conclude is that we should be agnostic
about whether the universe has a supernatural creator/designer. But
what’s worse, he argues, is that Carroll relies on an epistemological
premise we should reject in principle, and do reject in practice, something
like: “Don’t believe in anything not present to the senses unless it’s
required by the most compact and elegant and effective theories of the
physical world; visible and tangible things aside, believe only in what fig-
ures in the best scientific theories (unless the best scientific theories reveal
themselves as in some significant way incomplete, in which case it may be
permissible to believe in certain things that don’t figure in them but whose
postulation somehowmitigates that incompleteness).”
The next three papers in this series offer arguments favorable towards
theism. In the first, Richard Swinburne provides us with another look at
the alternative explanations for the fine tuning of the cosmos. Most of the
essay focuses on comparing theism with single universe naturalism as
competing explanations for fine tuning. Swinburne argues that such large
scale “Theories of Everything” have no contingent prior background infor-
mation which would allow us to assess their relative probablilities. As a
result, we are forced to rely on apriori considerations alone, specifically,
scope and simplicity. Since the views have equal scope, considerations of
simplicity are thus of central importance. Swinburne then argues, in direct
contrast to Carroll, that theism, postulating a single, infinitely knowledge-
able and powerful person as the cause of the universe, is vastly simpler
than any naturalistic explanation which must postulate the various laws
and constants necessary for humanoid life as brute facts.
In “The Many-Worlds Hypothesis as an Explanation of Cosmic Fine-tun-
ing: An Alternative to Design?” Robin Collins considers a common rejoinder
to the argument from fine-tuning, noted by both Primack and Carroll. On
this rejoinder, if there are a very large number of universes with varying
physical parameters, the surprisingness of fine-tuning at one universe pro-
portionately diminishes. Advocates of this “many-universe” objection have
proposed two types of multiple universes as possibilities here: physical and
metaphysical, and Collins considers each. Physical types are those that postu-
late a physical process to bring the multiple universes into existence. Collins
argues that these many-universe scenarios fail to undermine design since a
multiple universe generator would also have to be fine-tuned in important
respects. Metaphysical multiple world generators, which do not require a
serial process of universe creation, encounter other difficulties. First, it seems
that postulating metaphysical many-universes violates the principle that our
explanations should, all other things being equal, seek to invoke only entities
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which are observable or which are natural extensions of the causal powers of
things we know or experience. Second, Collins provides an ingenious argu-
ment that it is highly unlikely, if this scenario were correct, that we would be
observing a universe that is uniformly non-chaotic, since most life-sustaining
universes would not be. This provides us with good reason for thinking that
there are not in fact other actually existing universes.
In the final paper in this group, Del Ratzsch argues that the attempt to
defeat the fine-tuning inference to design by appeal to the existence of many
universes is a strategy that faces some crucial difficulties. He notes that many-
universe advocates adopt what Ratzsch calls a “saturation” approach to
explain fine-tuning. Since the many-universes saturate all of the state spaces
that possible universes could occupy, there is nothing about fine-tuning in our
universe that demands a designer. Ratzsch claims that these appeals to satu-
ration (a) do not immediately undercut appeals to design, and (b) certainly are
not inconsistent with the possibility of design. The former is true for a variety
of reasons. For example, the existence of many universes seems to require
appeal to a universe generating mechanism which may itself require fine tun-
ing, as Collins points out in his essay. The latter is true since intelligent agents
often use saturation strategies to achieve their aims. Perhaps, he claims, a cos-
mic designer has done so as ameans to universe design as well.
The final two papers focus on the connections between cosmology and
the Christian interpretation of the early chapters of Genesis. In “The Six
Days of Creation: SomeDisregarded Dimensions,” Professor Shokhin argues
that attempts by some Protestant thinkers, as well as certain Orthodox
thinkers who have followed their lead, to defend a reading of Genesis 1 and
2 as literal cosmological history fail in two respects. First, their accounts are
grossly incompatible with contemporary science, and second, their
hermeneutical principles are flawed. Following the lead of certain Orthodox
thinkers, most notably Saint Filaret, Shokhin offers an interpretation of the
early chapters of Genesis as a mythical redescription of the story of Christian
redemption. On this view, the days of creation refer not to twenty-four hour
periods of time nor to geologic epochs. Rather they refer to various stages of
man’s alienation from and reconciliationwith God.
Finally, in “The Place of God in Modern Cosmology,” Professor
Shimbalev argues that recent attempts to verify the truth of Scripture by
appeal to cosmology misunderstand the practices of both science and
hermeneutics. Instead, he claims, we should view the early chapters of
Genesis as largely allegorical. Nonetheless, we can find in Scripture certain
general affirmations about the nature of the universe. Those affirmations
consist of at least the following: creation ex nihilo, that creation constitutes
the beginning of time, that the creation is perfect and harmonious, that the
aim of creation is made manifest in the incarnation of Christ, and that God
continually participates in the life of his creation.
Franklin and Marshall College/University of Notre Dame
NOTES
1. Thanks to Stephen T. Davis for providing this summary of the conference.
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